The refined minerals the hardware is built from, and the electricity it runs on.
What's being done — and will it work? The EU's Critical Raw Materials Act (2024) sets 2030 targets: refine 40% of strategic materials domestically, source no more than 65% of any one from a single country. Concrete projects exist — Solvay is restarting rare-earth processing in La Rochelle; Sweden's Per Geijer deposit near Kiruna is Europe's largest known find. One project is further along than the rest. In Greece, METLEN Energy & Metals is building integrated gallium production at the Aluminium of Greece complex in Agios Nikolaos, Viotia — a €300m investment, recognised as a strategic project under the Critical Raw Materials Act and backed by European Investment Bank financing. Output is due to begin in 2027 and reach 50 tonnes a year by 2028, a volume that would cover the entire EU demand for gallium. In July 2026 METLEN signed a long-term agreement to supply about a quarter of that output to an unnamed leading US technology company — the first commercial gallium supply deal between a European producer and an American buyer, and a sign that the material has passed the customer qualification testing that sinks many new critical-minerals projects. But the targets are not binding, refining margins are thin without price guarantees, and new mines take 10–15 years to open. The conventional wisdom among specialists is that these dependencies might ease somewhat after 2030, but will not disappear within the decade.
Europe’s advantage here is not price. On price it is at a clear disadvantage: the IEA found that in 2025 EU electricity for energy-intensive industry averaged more than twice US levels and around 50% above China’s, and the cost was cited among the reasons OpenAI paused its planned UK data-centre project. What Europe does have is a low-carbon supply mix — French nuclear, Nordic and Alpine hydro — and specific regions where power is both clean and cheap by European standards, which is why Nordic and French sites attract AI investment while Germany and Italy do not.
What’s being done: the constraint most often reported is the wait to connect. Grid connection queues now run to years across much of Europe: Ireland has frozen new data-centre connections in the Dublin area until 2028, the Netherlands has declared grid congestion across large parts of the country with waiting lists for industrial connections, and analysis of local price effects suggests concentrated data-centre growth can raise regional electricity costs by 20–40% in hotspots such as Slough or the Paris region. The Commission’s Grid Action Plan and the 2026 grids package aim at faster permitting and more cross-border transmission; both address the queue rather than the price, and neither changes the tax and levy structure that accounts for much of the European price gap.
Europe imports almost all of its refined gallium and rare earths, and the 2030 targets are unlikely to change that materially. Its position on electricity is stronger: low-carbon generation is abundant, and the constraint is the speed of grid connection rather than supply.
Who does the research, who employs the researchers, and who funds the companies.
Coming soon.