Between autumn 2026 and autumn 2027, four of the Union’s five largest Member States will elect new governments or heads of state: Spain has just called snap elections for November 29; France votes on 18 April and 2 May; Italy must hold elections before the end of its legislature in the second half of the year; and Poland no later than 7 November. Finland, Estonia, Slovakia and Greece also go to the polls that same year. In most of these countries, parties skeptical of or hostile to European integration are in contention for power or are already in it.
Who votes · Nov 2026 – Dec 2027
— European countries hold a national election between November 2026 and December 2027, — of them EU Member States.
Because these elections fall within months of each other, their effects will combine. Today, we try to set out four plausible configurations of the EU’s power balance after 2027, asking what each would mean for the important that will define Europe’s next decade.
Beyond pro- and anti-EU
Political labels travel poorly across countries: “Conservative” means something different in Poland or in The Netherlands, and several European parties commonly grouped as “far right” disagree sharply on Russia.
For this analysis, we grouped national parties by their stance on European integration rather than by their position on the left-right scale – using mainly from political parties from countries voting in 2027, with a few reference parties from elsewhere.
Three camps and nine party families sit around Europe's table. Pick a camp or a chair to read where each one stands.
Eurosceptics can lose too
In Hungary this year, the incumbent most associated with the idea of a transnational nationalist bloc was removed at the ballot box. Péter Magyar’s Tisza party defeated Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in a landslide in April 2026, ending sixteen years of Orbán government in the highest-turnout election since Hungary’s transition to democracy (79.6%).
In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats, a nationalist party that backed the outgoing centre-right government from outside it and sits in the EU’s European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, lost votes in September for the first time since entering parliament.
Neither result reverses the broader rise of populist parties, but together they show that this rise is not automatic. Populist parties also struggle to act together: the very arguments that drive their success at home often divide them abroad. PiS and Fidesz, once close allies, split over Russia. Governing can also pull these parties apart: in office, Meloni has moved closer to the European mainstream while remaining in the sovereigntist ECR group. Strength at home does not translate into a coherent bloc in Brussels.
The one veto Europe cannot afford
The balance of power in the Council, and how far it can shift, depends on two voting rules.
First, unanimity: decisions on budget, sanctions, enlargement and most of foreign policy require that all 27 EU Member States agree on the final decision, so a single government can block any common position on these matters
Second, the blocking minority: in most other matters than the ones listed above, qualified majority voting applies, requiring at least four Member States representing at least 35% of the EU’s population.
France matters on both counts. It holds a veto like every Member State, but it also carries roughly 15% of the Union’s population, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, a nuclear deterrent and half of the Franco-German partnership.
France elects its president in two rounds: if no candidate wins an absolute majority in the first round, the two leading candidates face each other in a run-off two weeks later. Throughout spring 2026, polls placed Marine Le Pen well ahead in the first round, at around 35%, with Édouard Philippe, a centre-right candidate, founder of the “Horizon” party, and former prime minister, in second place (around 21%), slightly ahead of Jean-Luc Mélanchon from la France insoumise (around 17%) – a far left, anti-EU, anti-NATO movement. The first round is therefore less a contest for first place than for second place in the run-off. If Philippe holds it, voters will choose between the “Pragmatic Mainstream” and the “Patriot Takeover” family. If Mélenchon overtakes him, France will face a run-off between two sovereigntist candidates.
The second factor, after the French elections, is whether Poland and Spain hold their current pro-European governments or shift towards mixed coalition. In Poland, Donald Tusk’s broad pro-European coalition, in power since 2023, faces a possible return of PiS, the national-conservative party, likely in alliance with Konfederacja, a more radical right-wing grouping.
In Spain, the socialist Pedro Sánchez, in office since 2018, faces the centre-right Partido Popular. The question is whether it could govern alone or would need Vox, a radical-right party, which would bring a Patriot Takeover party into government. Italy, governed since 2022 by Meloni’s right-wing coalition, is treated here as a constant, as she is expected to remain prime minister. The main uncertainty lies to her right as former general Roberto Vannacci is now questioning Meloni’s hegemony on hard-right voters, and threatening her run for a second mandate.
The labels “best” and “worst” below describe outcomes from the standpoint of European integration.
A new momentum for integration (best case).
A pro-European candidate wins in France, and Poland and Spain remain governed by pro-EU, mainstream governments. With Hungary's recent change of government, only two governments would remain in the “Sovereigntists” camp: Czechia (Patriot Takeover) and Slovakia (Sovereign Left). The number of likely veto players would fall at its lowest level in more than a decade, and the Union would have room to move on defence integration, enlargement and a larger budget.
Firewall France (acceptable)
A pro-European candidate wins the French presidency, but Poland returns to a PiS-led government (Atlanticist Reformers), possibly with Konfederacja, and Spain's Partido Popular may need Vox (Patriot Takeover) to govern. Negotiations on migration, budget, Ukraine and defence would become slower and more transactional, but no stable blocking coalition would emerge on qualified majority files. The Franco-German axis would survive, at least until the German federal election now scheduled for early 2029, when a strong result for the AfD, a far-right party with close ties to Moscow, is a real possibility.
France breaks the rank (bad scenario).
The Rassemblement National wins the 2027 presidential election, and Marine Le Pen joins the European Council, while Warsaw and Madrid keep mainstream governments. On decisions requiring unanimity, France could block on its own, carrying the political cost of each veto alone. On decisions taken by qualified majority, even by sidelining with like-minded governments in Czechia and Slovakia, it would represent only about 19% of the EU's population, far below the 35% needed. The EU could stay broadly on course, but without France's traditional role as agenda-setter.
Paris – Warsaw Veto Axis (worst case).
Sovereigntist parties win in both France and Poland. Together they account for about 23.5% of the EU's population, still short of the 35% needed for a blocking minority. Without Italy, which under Meloni has rarely used its weight to block, only Spain could close the gap but a Partido Popular government, even one dependent on Vox, would be an unlikely partner. Their power would lie in coordination: on every decision requiring unanimity, from the EU budget to Ukraine's accession and the renewal of sanctions, they could share the cost of vetoes or take turns blocking, as Hungary and Slovakia did on the Ukraine loan in 2026. Working around them would also be harder, since the Union would lose both a major budget contributor and the largest user of its defence loans.
What consequences on key European challenges
Published: 09/10/2026 – The Europeans Admin